We describe and discuss an affordable way to spread huge software without relying on internet connection, via the use of self-replicating live USB keys.
INTRODUCTION
Despite claims and hopes supporting this idea, being free software is definitely not a sufficient condition for being usable in "developing countries". A reason is that free software and internet are intimately interdependent. Internet growth was made possible through open standards and implementations. Being free as a beer and built by communities interacting all over the world, free software relies on the internet to be spread and developed.
Unfortunately, the cost of bandwidth is very expensive in those countries especially relative to the local income [10] , and the available bandwidth does not allow huge downloads making downloading a Linux distribution (and its updates) more expensive than getting cracked copies of Windows operating system. This network consideration seems to be an important bottleneck in spreading free software where bandwidth is a rare commodity [12] . [13] .
To thwart that phenomenon, Canonical used to distribute free CD of the Ubuntu distribution, but unfortunately ended this service [4] , forgetting in the meantime that downloading has a cost:
After delivering millions of Ubuntu CD's to millions of new users, our ShipIt program has finally run its course. While we can no longer deliver free CD's through the program, it's still easy to get Ubuntu. You can download Ubuntu for free from Ubuntu.com or you can buy a CD straight from the Canonical shop.
Even for a well-funded distribution, burning and sending free CD at each (6 months) release has a cost! We try to propose here an alternative way to distribute huge free software at low cost, among a defined community.
Context
Sage [13] is a mathematical software aiming at being a free alternative to Mathematica, Maple, Matlab, Magma,... Its compressed minimal binary weighs about 650MB. Uncompressed binary with additional GAP database weighs up to 3GB.
In order to prepare the CIMPA/ICPAM research school to be held in 2012 that contained a lecture about Sage [6] , a workshop was organized in 2011 with local mathematician colleagues [5] . This was the occasion to distribute this software among participants and start playing with it, in order to let the local team to help during the Sage lectures (73 participants attended the school, which requires support in helping participants to debug their code).
Concerning installations, we experienced quite a lot of problems related to the lack of internet connection at the university itself, and to the age of some machines (starting from Pentium 3). First, Sage does not run natively on Windows: the classical workaround is to run its server from a virtualized Linux distribution. Such a method is not a viable solution on slow computers, so the software needs to be run directly from a non-emulated Linux/BSD/Unix. We brought copies of Linux distributions, but running Sage binaries on them requires some small additional dependencies, a small detail that become a harsh when they have to be downloaded from a cybercafé a few kilometers from the campus. Moreover, repartitioning the users hard disks without backup may cause personal data loss. Therefore, the best solution was to run Sage from the live CD (turned into a live USB with persistence to be able to store personal worksheets from one session to the next one), which is not emulated, contains required dependencies, and does not touch the user hard disk.
Another advantage of the USB key over fast internet connection is its worldwide availability, at low cost. The main concern with the live USB is the difficulty to spread it among colleagues and students after the workshop as it requires from the user some knowledge on how to make the target USB key bootable.
Solution
During this first workshop in 2011, we built a prototype of a script allowing the existing Sage Live (based on Puppy Linux [8] ) to clone itself on another USB key, indefinitely, in one click. As a fork of an existing live USB, it turned out to be hard to maintain, hence we decided to start an autonomous USB key based on Live Debian system [2] : Sage Debian Live http://sagedebianlive.metelu.net/ [11] .
DESCRIPTION OF THE SELF-REPLICATING LIVE USB KEY
The main feature of this USB key, besides running Sage under Linux, is its ability to clone itself on any sufficiently large USB key, in a few clicks, without requiring any knowledge. Figure 4 : "Clone the USB key" icon So, not only the Sage software is transmitted, but also the Linux distribution, which holds the self-replicating capability.
Features and design principles

Upgrading an existing USB key
When the USB key already contains some data, or a previous version of the software, the clone script can keep the personal data and installs the software over the previous version. This feature is interesting in a teaching environment, ensuring a uniform versioning among students, that ease code debugging.
Offline autonomy
Most of the live USB distributions aim at being small (they usually try to fit on a CD-ROM, and sometimes much less). This diet is done by removing most of the documentation (for example, in Puppy Linux, the man command opens a web browser to an on-line manual page, which is clever, but unsuitable for an off-line use), and having only a few packages installed by default. Hence, being light implies being connected. Here, we need to take the opposite way, and try to be as exhaustive and autonomous as possible. Being fat is not a problem (the clone operation is a bit longer but the key-to-key copy bandwidth is quite high). For example, we included translations of some software and all locales are generated during the build. The current Sage Debian Live weighs 2.7 GB, which corresponds to 8.4 GB of compressed data. It can be cloned in about 10 minutes, depending on the speed of the USB key.
Straightforward persistence
The installation is made easy by the fact that the personal data are stored on the main vfat partition, bypassing the traditional persistence scheme which requires another partition in a POSIX compliant format. Since vfat is not POSIX compliant, our straightforward persistence scheme bind-remounts the main partition with an additional POSIX layer (thanks to fuse-posixovl). It allows the user to have a direct access to the data she produced with Sage (or L A T E X or any other tool distributed with the USB key), when using the USB key in a standard way.
Keeping personal data
Though straightforward persistence allows the user to create and store personal content, no personal data is duplicated to the cloned USB key. For this purpose, the clone script uses a white list containing the files that have to be copied to the target USB key. This can be made easy by the fact that the whole system is enclosed in a single squashfs read-only compressed filesystem.
Sharing interesting data between users
An exception is made for data put by the user in the /share directory, which will be transmitted to the next USB keys. This allows interaction between participants (e.g. sharing pictures), as well as the possibility for the source to distribute additional files (lecture notes, exercises sheets), without having to recompile a whole USB key image.
CD bootloader
Old computers are sometimes not able to boot from the USB key, but all of them are able to boot from the CD-ROM, hence the live USB contains a small bootloader ISO [7] which can be burnt on a CD in one click, allowing the USB key to be loaded after booting on the CD. 
Sublinear spread complexity
As noticed, the clone procedure takes about 10 minutes for a key containing 2.7GB of data (about 8 minutes for an upgrade), which corresponds to a bandwidth of 4.5MB/s (this measurement was done with the cheapest 8GB USB 2.0 key we bought). Since each cloned USB key can become a new seeder, the live USB key can be spread among n participants in time O(log(n)), which is not possible via classical wireless hubs, even with a locally-hosted mirror. In our case, since at least 3 different versions (bug fixes, improvements and user feedback) were deployed during the 2 weeks school in Bobo Dioulasso, this sublinear spread complexity was of great interest, since the key could be redeployed among participants in two coffee breaks. In a room of 60 participants, there will be 6 cloning rounds until everybody gets a fulfilled key, so even if participants take 5 minutes to boot and play around before launching the clone, the amortized bandwidth becomes 30MB/s. This bandwidth can still be increased by a constant factor, by allowing a USB key to spawn as many USB keys as the number of USB ports available. However, we have to be very careful in the targets selection since cloning the USB key on the hard disk accidentally would be fatal (the current tests are quite strict, and refuse to start if the total number of USB devices is not equal to 2, hence if for some reason, one of the internal devices is recognized as a USB drive, the script will not go further. This happened on one laptop, though the extra USB device was the internal CD-ROM reader).
Modularity
The source code is made of modules, aiming at being as independent as possible. In particular, all the Sage stuff can be easily removed, to spread any kind of software, with respect to the limitations described in 3.2.2.
Limitations
Getting feedback
It is interesting to see how could such a USB key be spread and, in case it is used to share files within a community, what is the data renewal or the mixing rate. Which feature offers an "evolutive advantage" to the USB key? For example, can the USB key cross borders between countries not sharing the same language ? Software statistics are usually done via counting the number of downloads, but here we precisely want to measure the off-line spreading of the USB key, not the initiation of a stream. For this, we built a genealogy system that allows to track the history of the ancestors of the USB key as well as which USB keys it spawned. To avoid privacy leaks (and annoying pop-up when the user get connected to the internet), the genealogy file is sent only when the user explicitly decides to, and actually, the associated contact form was only used as a way to get direct support (a non-planned feature). 
Integrity
The self-replicating scheme can be compared with a software virus. And indeed, the live USB key can be easily modified by an attacker, by simply modifying the publicly available sources and bootstrap her custom USB key. The issue is that the USB key cannot test its own integrity: an attacker could distribute a USB key with modified versions of all tools allowing integrity checks (signing or checksumming software). Hence, to get confident that the USB key was not modified during the transportation, the user has to check the SHA256SUMS on the website, with her own tools. This requires an internet connection, some knowledge and some motivation.
Therefore, this communication-via-replication protocol currently relies on trust, and should be only used for short distance communication (e.g. in a classroom deployment, there is not enough time to modify the USB key between two consecutive clone operations), or among a small structured community. This is well adapted for a specialized software such as Sage, probably less for a mainstream software such as Linux.
For example, one could imagine spreading off-line versions of Wikipedia, using Kiwix software, but in the current framework, this could have harmful consequences.
Ecological impact
The size of the USB keys is still growing very fast, making them rapidly obsolete. In relying upon them, one promotes their consumption and disposal.
RELATED APPROACHES
Key System hardware
This company sells USB keys with both male and female USB connectors, allowing the data to be directly transferred to another USB key, without the need for a computer [9] . We do not know whether is is able to format the target USB key though.
While being an appealing solution, this requires a specific hardware, which should be spread along with the software if we want the diffusion to be iterated. It is moreover much more expensive than standard USB keys (50 euros for a 4GB USB key as of 2013).
USB nets
In the previous Extremecom conference, Panayotis Antoniadis, Larch Chen and Franck Legendre, studied USB nets (see [1] and references therein), where participants distribute USB keys filled with interesting data.
The main issue addressed in the paper was in motivating the community to behave in an altruist way. In aiming to change our cultural mind via the use of some technology, this is quite an ambitious project.
Here, the hardware is not transferred, only the data is. Each participant to the network needs to have a single USB key, and the motivation for a user to buy a USB key is actually selfish. In particular, privacy leaks related to the recovery of deleted files is avoided since the USB keys are not assumed to change their owner.
That said, one could imagine a USB net based on selfreplicating live USB keys: the interesting data could be put on the /share directory, and the live system could be limited to various media readers, as well as a tool for indexing and organizing the data (e.g via an off-line wiki or a collaborative spreadsheet). A restriction for this being to limit the spread to small communities, as explained in Subsection 3.2.2.
Conversely, the fun introduced in USB nets to get feedback could be used in our case.
Comparison with other live USB
Technically, most live USB have the possibility to replicate themselves, provided they contain partitioning tools (like sfdisk or parted), formatting tools (like mkfs.vfat), and bootloaders (like syslinux), which are all small and standards binaries. Writing a clone script is not hard either.
It seems that none of the existing live USB aims at being spread via a key-to-key protocol, they are mainly built from a CD ISO file, using either a software like unetbootin or yumi or using the isohybrid format, allowing the CD ISO image to be directly copied to the USB key. Here, the live USB is the final target.
The closest tools we found in inspecting existing solutions were the two install wizards distributed with Puppy Linux. Unfortunately, they are somehow too powerful and can not be used out of the box for an inexperienced Linux user. If we start the process with an unformatted USB key, the wizard will suggest to use the "Universal Installer", then propose to select the target device (among which the source USB key appears!), then propose the user to use gpared to configure its partitions, this operation requires the user to take an initiative. The second tool named "Bootflash USB installer", will format and make the USB key bootable in one click, but will require the user to provide an ISO file as a source. At this point, it is possible to relaunch the first wizard and finish the installation, but most Linux newcomer will surrender before that step.
One reason for such a complex behaviour may be the fact that the tool is aimed at installing the distribution, no matter the target disk (they all belong to a single list). There is however quite a big difference between replicating the USB key to another one and installing its content to a computer hard disk. Physically, the first copies a squashfs image to the target USB key, the second should do an uncompressed install with taking care about partitions, other present OSes, swap, etc. Semantically, the action of replicating the USB key corresponds to circulating the software with as few modifications as possible, whereas hard disk installation corresponds to settle it in a cleaner way. Those two processes should be separated.
By the way, it is worth noticing that, though the possibility to install the live USB key on the computer hard disk is available in the source code of the Sage Debian Live key, is currently not enabled in the distributed keys to avoid misuses and possible data loss.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of a self-replicating bootable USB key allowed the Sage lectures of the CIMPA/ ICPAM research school to go smoothly, as well as some further Sage deployments.
While being very efficient for our purpose of spreading huge free software inside a community, it is definitely not advisable for spreading sensitive software, or for large-scale distribution.
A possible workaround could be to take advantage of the upgrade feature, which creates some recurrence in the interactions between USB keys, possibly allowing some trust accumulation. For example, if a user has two live USB keys, she can expose the first one to be upgraded by someone else, and then boot on the second live USB key to check the integrity of the first one. In that checking process, we should ensure that the new files are authenticated, but also that the boot sector really points to those files (not to a malicious system located somewhere else on the filesystem). When users only have one live USB key, we could imagine a game where, when two users meet each other, instead of booting on the newest USB key to upgrade the oldest USB key, the users could randomly draw which USB key should boot in order to check the other one for integrity.
Such protocols still needs to be evaluated and experimented, they should be understandable by anyone and should not provide a false sense of security when misused.
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